In Maine, 32 M.R.S.A. § 284(1), Defining Auction, Does Not Require That Goods be Sold to the Highest Bidder in Accordance with the Traditional Auction Format for a Sale to Fall Within the Definition of Auction

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Audrely L. Street v. Board of Licensing of Auctioneers  889 A.2d 319 (Me. 2006), held that for a sale to constitute an auction, it is not necessary that the goods be sold to the highest bidder in the traditional auction format. The Court stated that, 32 M.R.S.A. § 284(1), the section defining auction does not impose such a requirement.
 
This case involved an auction sale in which the Petitioner contended that the sale did not constitute an auction.  In this case, the Maine Board of Licensing Auctioneers (“Board”) sanctioned Audrey L. Street (“Plaintiff”), a licensed auctioneer in Maine for failing to follow procedures. The Plaintiff had agreed to hold a joint auction with Arthur P. Wood (“Wood”), an auctioneer not licensed in Maine. Shortly before the auction, the Plaintiff came to doubt Wood’s credibility. Therefore, although the Plaintiff was present at the auction, she did not “call” the auction.  However, the Plaintiff collected money for every item sold. Subsequently, Wood filed a complaint with the Board alleging that the Plaintiff conducted an auction but did not provide an accounting or a written contract. And the Board sanctioned the Plaintiff for not complying with the auction procedures. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. This appeal followed.  

The Plaintiff contended that the sale of Wood's property did not constitute an auction and she did not act as auctioneer but instead merely provided administrative assistance and the venue in which the sale was conducted. Audrely L. Street 889 A.2d  at 322. Because sections 291(1)(B) and 298 are applicable to her only in the course of conducting an auction as auctioneer and on behalf of a consignor, the Plaintiff argued that the Board erred in determining that she violated auction related provisions of law.  Id.

The Court observed that  32 M.R.S.A. § 284(1) defines "auction" as "the offering of goods or real estate for sale by means of exchanges between an auctioneer and bidders." Id. The Plaintiff argued that no auction took place because Wood's goods were not sold to the highest bidder in the traditional auction format. Rather, a "pass-out" auction took place in which, as the testimony indicated, "an item is offered up and if the price is to the liking or at least there's a profit, then more than one item might be sold to all those who wish to purchase it at the price that it was sold for at the auction." Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court’s observation.  The Supreme Court stated that the definition of "auction" in section 284 does not require that goods be sold to the highest bidder in accordance with the traditional auction format. Rather, the term "auction" unambiguously applies to the offering of goods by means of any type of exchange between auctioneer and bidder, as occurred in this case. See 32 M.R.S.A. § 284(1). Id.  

The Supreme Court also noted that the Plaintiff's attempt to limit the statute's plainly broad definition of "auction" is without merits. Therefore the Supreme Court state that the Board's determination that an auction took place is not error. Id.

The Plaintiff also contested that her acts did not fall within the definition of an auctioneer.  The Court noted that an Auctioneer" is defined as "any person who conducts, advertises or offers that person's service to conduct auctions; contracts or offers to contract with consignors of real or personal property, with or without receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other valuable consideration; or sells or offers to sell property at auction." 32 M.R.S.A. § 284(2). Id at 322. After analyzing the facts, the Court found that the Plaintiff advertised herself as an auctioneer and formed an oral contract with Wood to hold an auction within the scope of her auctioneering license; and she took a primary role in accepting the payments at the sale itself. Id at 322. The fact that the Plaintiff did not actually “call” the auction cannot be taken in the Plaintiff’s favor because the statute does not include such requirement within the definition of the term “auctioneer.” Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that Board reasonably determined that the Plaintiff's actions fell within the definition of auctioneer Id.